From where do the criteria for choice come? The self, insofar as one is capable of knowing it. Does the self generate the criteria? No, not usually (although some syntheses are original for a given individual). Instead, one is made aware of criteria from some outside source (speech, text, etc.) and then assents to them (consciously or otherwise). It would be best, in order to increase authenticity, for a person to assent to the rules they use in choosing consciously. Then, through this process of reflective self-endorsement, the individual incorporates the criteria into himself. He says, "I recognize the validity of choosing thus, and so I will choose thus." Thereafter, whenever a specific criterion is operative, the action is authentic (i.e., owned by the person who performs it).
It is better for a person to grab hold of her life once the gift is given to her since she, by default, already holds it weakly (i.e., responsibility is already active).
The question for the living individual who wishes to take possession of her greatest gift is: to what or to whom ought I assent? Depersonalized propositions and personal proposals confront every individual. Some offer themselves directly as propositions to be believed. Others simply pose and it is up to the individual to offer it to herself. Together, they set the table of possible criteria of which the living individual is aware. A person consumes beliefs on the basis of the criteria she assents to. As one eats a salad with a salad fork, one consumes materialistic propositions with an empiricist's knife.
No sooner does one tuck in one's napkin under one's chin than does one run up to another problem. "How am I to choose how am I to choose?" The line of questioning continues ad infinitum. How can one stop it? Through passion.
A man looks at a smörgåsbord and some items make him salivate more than others. How does he get this taste for the salty or the sweet? From his desires. And his desires? From his past and what he's chosen to constitute as his past. "Ah, choice again? But how?" Here we meet with one of the reasons why people are ineffable: they do not know the sum of their contents and neither do their contemporaries.
Passion is a consequence of something unchosen and something chosen. The extent that events press upon us, arousing our emotions, is unchosen. We react beyond how we would have chosen to. The extent that we act upon our passions is chosen. Just as reflective self-endorsement makes the chosen more chosen by making it conscious and sober, self-knowledge makes the unchosen less so by creating an accurate system of expected reactions to events. We live more when we reflectively self-endorse more of what we believe and know who we are and why we believe as we do more.
Showing posts with label authority. Show all posts
Showing posts with label authority. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Authority
A man stands before you and commands, "March!" How responsible would you be if you did? How responsible would you be if you did not?
If you take a look at the man (notice his finely cropped hair, his polished boots, his badge) and you begin to march--how responsible are you? "I only marched because his authority overwhelmed me. Were he not an officer of the law, I would not have moved," you say. I respond, "Your defense is inadequate. You may have found his authority compelling, but you are still within the equation of responsibility. The officer (including the image he projected) plus you (including your recognition and assent to authority) equals the responsibility in the situation. Were he not there, you would not have moved--true enough. If you thought nothing of officers, if you neither feared nor respected the law, however, you would not have moved either."
Ceding freedom to authority does not happen without an act of concession, which leaves the conceder partially responsible. It does not follow from this that the weight or prestige of authority is completely fabricated by the person who concedes to it. More accurately, it is as though the officer says, "I m to be listened to," and the conceder responds, "I agree."
It is often held against a person who goes her own way by critical contemporaries that her actions are capricious. "She has no rule by which she acts; she only does whatever strikes her fancy at the time." - "Do you suggest that a person who on the contrary only acts on rules never does what strikes her fancy? If she acts, for instance, according to the rule, 'Always abide by the law and its officers' commands,' she does not act from her fancy (i.e., what she prefers)? I cannot agree--for a thing chosen is ultimately a thing most preferred. Since a person who submits to authority--to some extent--chooses to, that person's fancy is active. From your criticism, you imply that a person's fancy is always capricious. The person who acts on rules is also capricious."
If the criticism for a person who goes his own way also adheres to the rule-abider, how might the rule-abider more aptly criticize the independent person? Both sorts act on rules (to abide by fancy and to abide by authority) and both sorts are capricious (insofar as what they do is influenced by what they fancy). What precisely is the difference between them? The independent person gives the greatest credence to her own passions and convictions; the dependent person gives the greatest credence to an outside source. Though both invest themselves into positions they bare responsibility for, they invest in different positions.
The independent person says of himself, "I am honest. I know that what I think and do is at bottom a consequence of what I most recently have thought is true and good. I recognize that I am free to accept or reject my own predilections. I think the only consistent thing to do is to accept them, since rejecting them is still done on the grounds of a predilection--that what I most recently have thought is true and good is actually false and bad."
The dependent person says of himself, "I am correct. I know that my private predilections are given to error, so I reject them in favor of more impersonal decision-makers. I accept authority because it is greater than I am, has a larger wealth of input and understanding. I recognize that a person can never upon reflection know objectively whether they are thinking correctly and doing rightly with certainty, so I defer to an outside party for objectivity."
The independent person emphasizes subjectivity; the dependent person emphasizes objectivity. The rule-abider may aptly criticize the independent person for solipsism. The independent person may retort with a charge of bad faith (a conscious disavowal of freedom where freedom persists) against the dependent person.
The independent person faces a problem of epistemology. The dependent person faces a problem of ethics. The independent person believes as she does on circular grounds; she believes she is right because she believes she is right. The dependent person operates on a faulty notion of her beliefs, for she acts as though she is not free and thereby not responsibly when she is both (if only partially).
When one retains autonomy, one retains the risk of faulty self-determination. When one concedes to heteronomy, one retains responsibility for the concession with the risk of thinking it too was handed over. When faced with the dichotomy between autonomy and heteronomy, what will the existing individual do? Those who seek the truth will choose the former; those who avoid error will choose the latter.
Is it possible that the existing individual may choose one in one circumstance, and the other in another? Yes. How are the circumstances different if they prompt different choices from the same individual? Rules cover different areas of conduct. The passion the individual feels about the area of conduct influences the individual's choice. For some, an area of scant personal relevance and importance is an area that most warrants heteronomy. To them, the feeling of apathy makes the discharge of responsibility permissible. "I don't care. You decide." For others, an area of immense personal relevance and importance is an area that most warrants heteronomy. To them, the feeling of gravity makes the discharge of responsibility permissible. "I care too much. You decide."
Should a person be consistently one or the other or should a person be both, though in different areas? In economics, it is commonly advisable for the sake of mitigating risk to diversify one's portfolio. In politics, it is commonly advisable for the sake of reputation to toe the party line. The former has the benefit of safety for the investor; the latter has the benefit of predictability for the politician. Does a person want to benefit privately (by self-reflective standards of benefit) or publicly (by other-reflective standards of benefit)? A person esteems inconsistency because it is not constricting upon them. People esteem consistency because it is readily understandable and therefor manageable.
By marching, one accepts partial responsibility for the path taken and the destination arrived at, since one participates in both. By not marching, one accepts consequences from the authority for not recognizing him. March and you may be led off a cliff by your own feet; stay still and you may be shot for insubordination by an authority you do not recognize. Marching is a dangerous movement if the destination is still; stillness is a precarious position if the setting is in motion.
If you take a look at the man (notice his finely cropped hair, his polished boots, his badge) and you begin to march--how responsible are you? "I only marched because his authority overwhelmed me. Were he not an officer of the law, I would not have moved," you say. I respond, "Your defense is inadequate. You may have found his authority compelling, but you are still within the equation of responsibility. The officer (including the image he projected) plus you (including your recognition and assent to authority) equals the responsibility in the situation. Were he not there, you would not have moved--true enough. If you thought nothing of officers, if you neither feared nor respected the law, however, you would not have moved either."
Ceding freedom to authority does not happen without an act of concession, which leaves the conceder partially responsible. It does not follow from this that the weight or prestige of authority is completely fabricated by the person who concedes to it. More accurately, it is as though the officer says, "I m to be listened to," and the conceder responds, "I agree."
It is often held against a person who goes her own way by critical contemporaries that her actions are capricious. "She has no rule by which she acts; she only does whatever strikes her fancy at the time." - "Do you suggest that a person who on the contrary only acts on rules never does what strikes her fancy? If she acts, for instance, according to the rule, 'Always abide by the law and its officers' commands,' she does not act from her fancy (i.e., what she prefers)? I cannot agree--for a thing chosen is ultimately a thing most preferred. Since a person who submits to authority--to some extent--chooses to, that person's fancy is active. From your criticism, you imply that a person's fancy is always capricious. The person who acts on rules is also capricious."
If the criticism for a person who goes his own way also adheres to the rule-abider, how might the rule-abider more aptly criticize the independent person? Both sorts act on rules (to abide by fancy and to abide by authority) and both sorts are capricious (insofar as what they do is influenced by what they fancy). What precisely is the difference between them? The independent person gives the greatest credence to her own passions and convictions; the dependent person gives the greatest credence to an outside source. Though both invest themselves into positions they bare responsibility for, they invest in different positions.
The independent person says of himself, "I am honest. I know that what I think and do is at bottom a consequence of what I most recently have thought is true and good. I recognize that I am free to accept or reject my own predilections. I think the only consistent thing to do is to accept them, since rejecting them is still done on the grounds of a predilection--that what I most recently have thought is true and good is actually false and bad."
The dependent person says of himself, "I am correct. I know that my private predilections are given to error, so I reject them in favor of more impersonal decision-makers. I accept authority because it is greater than I am, has a larger wealth of input and understanding. I recognize that a person can never upon reflection know objectively whether they are thinking correctly and doing rightly with certainty, so I defer to an outside party for objectivity."
The independent person emphasizes subjectivity; the dependent person emphasizes objectivity. The rule-abider may aptly criticize the independent person for solipsism. The independent person may retort with a charge of bad faith (a conscious disavowal of freedom where freedom persists) against the dependent person.
The independent person faces a problem of epistemology. The dependent person faces a problem of ethics. The independent person believes as she does on circular grounds; she believes she is right because she believes she is right. The dependent person operates on a faulty notion of her beliefs, for she acts as though she is not free and thereby not responsibly when she is both (if only partially).
When one retains autonomy, one retains the risk of faulty self-determination. When one concedes to heteronomy, one retains responsibility for the concession with the risk of thinking it too was handed over. When faced with the dichotomy between autonomy and heteronomy, what will the existing individual do? Those who seek the truth will choose the former; those who avoid error will choose the latter.
Is it possible that the existing individual may choose one in one circumstance, and the other in another? Yes. How are the circumstances different if they prompt different choices from the same individual? Rules cover different areas of conduct. The passion the individual feels about the area of conduct influences the individual's choice. For some, an area of scant personal relevance and importance is an area that most warrants heteronomy. To them, the feeling of apathy makes the discharge of responsibility permissible. "I don't care. You decide." For others, an area of immense personal relevance and importance is an area that most warrants heteronomy. To them, the feeling of gravity makes the discharge of responsibility permissible. "I care too much. You decide."
Should a person be consistently one or the other or should a person be both, though in different areas? In economics, it is commonly advisable for the sake of mitigating risk to diversify one's portfolio. In politics, it is commonly advisable for the sake of reputation to toe the party line. The former has the benefit of safety for the investor; the latter has the benefit of predictability for the politician. Does a person want to benefit privately (by self-reflective standards of benefit) or publicly (by other-reflective standards of benefit)? A person esteems inconsistency because it is not constricting upon them. People esteem consistency because it is readily understandable and therefor manageable.
By marching, one accepts partial responsibility for the path taken and the destination arrived at, since one participates in both. By not marching, one accepts consequences from the authority for not recognizing him. March and you may be led off a cliff by your own feet; stay still and you may be shot for insubordination by an authority you do not recognize. Marching is a dangerous movement if the destination is still; stillness is a precarious position if the setting is in motion.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Persuasion
A person stands before you and says, "believe me." Implicit in all written documents is a similar exhortation. All successful communication involves belief, that the speaker is trusted by the audience. An individual is frequently asked to assent to propositions introduced by another. Should you?
If there are nefarious motivations for the persuasion, perhaps not. Why would one person try to persuade another person to believe as they do? Persuasion involves conscious intention; a person persuades on purpose. As with all purposeful activity, there is a possible logical explanation for persuasion. Some social activities (actions involving more than the individual) are primarily performed for egocentric reasons. In such situations, the other (or others) have an accidental role. The actor is not ultimately concerned with his audience, but with himself. Applied to the action under consideration here, persuading another person is not the persuader's ultimate concern. The persuader could be uncertain of his own beliefs, and thus allay his anxiety by counting another person amongst the believers like him. He wants to place himself into the truth, and attempts to do so by surrounding himself with like-minded people.
Other social actions are primarily performed for tuistic reasons. In such situations, the other (or others) have an essential role. The actor is ultimately concerned with his audience, not himself. In the situation under consideration here, persuading another person is the persuader's ultimate concern. He could simply be trying to relay the truth to another person, and thus acts to her benefit by making her more informed. He wants to bring the audience into the truth, and brings into himself a sense of accomplishment.
Some tuistic actions have malevolent intentions. The persuader here has a will to deceive, wishing from malice to harm the person being persuaded. Here we may place all instances of swindling and lying.
Ideally, communication involves a reciprocity of interest. The speaker is interested (primarily) in the audience--not herself--and the audience is interested (primarily) in the speaker--not themselves. In the first scenario considered here, the persuader is less credible; in the second and third scenarios, the persuader is more credible. Credibility is diminished within a context of conflicted interest. In the first scenario, the persuader is more conflicted. He is doing you a service only by doing himself a service, which is to say he is doing you a disservice. The second and third scenarios may be outwardly indistinguishable to the other person involved in the communication. Trust and distrust are introduced as the means for navigating within the uncertainty. In assessing the situation, the other person may believe and take a risk that the scenario is of the third kind. Or, the other person may disbelieve and take a risk that the scenario is of the second kind.
A tricky thing about people is that they are complex. A given person may harbor all three reasons for persuasion at the same time.
To communicate is a precarious act. To volunteer an observation that may be incorrect, that may be incorporated into another's party's belief-system, that may then be acted upon, that may bring about more ugliness in the world--this is the risk of the speaker, the writer, or the artist. (Moreover, it is the risk of anyone who has a public face, for we are always emanating examples through our living.) Ethics is deeply enmeshed in communication because we take so many of our cues for beliefs from our community.
If there are nefarious motivations for the persuasion, perhaps not. Why would one person try to persuade another person to believe as they do? Persuasion involves conscious intention; a person persuades on purpose. As with all purposeful activity, there is a possible logical explanation for persuasion. Some social activities (actions involving more than the individual) are primarily performed for egocentric reasons. In such situations, the other (or others) have an accidental role. The actor is not ultimately concerned with his audience, but with himself. Applied to the action under consideration here, persuading another person is not the persuader's ultimate concern. The persuader could be uncertain of his own beliefs, and thus allay his anxiety by counting another person amongst the believers like him. He wants to place himself into the truth, and attempts to do so by surrounding himself with like-minded people.
Other social actions are primarily performed for tuistic reasons. In such situations, the other (or others) have an essential role. The actor is ultimately concerned with his audience, not himself. In the situation under consideration here, persuading another person is the persuader's ultimate concern. He could simply be trying to relay the truth to another person, and thus acts to her benefit by making her more informed. He wants to bring the audience into the truth, and brings into himself a sense of accomplishment.
Some tuistic actions have malevolent intentions. The persuader here has a will to deceive, wishing from malice to harm the person being persuaded. Here we may place all instances of swindling and lying.
Ideally, communication involves a reciprocity of interest. The speaker is interested (primarily) in the audience--not herself--and the audience is interested (primarily) in the speaker--not themselves. In the first scenario considered here, the persuader is less credible; in the second and third scenarios, the persuader is more credible. Credibility is diminished within a context of conflicted interest. In the first scenario, the persuader is more conflicted. He is doing you a service only by doing himself a service, which is to say he is doing you a disservice. The second and third scenarios may be outwardly indistinguishable to the other person involved in the communication. Trust and distrust are introduced as the means for navigating within the uncertainty. In assessing the situation, the other person may believe and take a risk that the scenario is of the third kind. Or, the other person may disbelieve and take a risk that the scenario is of the second kind.
A tricky thing about people is that they are complex. A given person may harbor all three reasons for persuasion at the same time.
To communicate is a precarious act. To volunteer an observation that may be incorrect, that may be incorporated into another's party's belief-system, that may then be acted upon, that may bring about more ugliness in the world--this is the risk of the speaker, the writer, or the artist. (Moreover, it is the risk of anyone who has a public face, for we are always emanating examples through our living.) Ethics is deeply enmeshed in communication because we take so many of our cues for beliefs from our community.
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