Authority

A man stands before you and commands, "March!" How responsible would you be if you did? How responsible would you be if you did not?

If you take a look at the man (notice his finely cropped hair, his polished boots, his badge) and you begin to march--how responsible are you? "I only marched because his authority overwhelmed me. Were he not an officer of the law, I would not have moved," you say. I respond, "Your defense is inadequate. You may have found his authority compelling, but you are still within the equation of responsibility. The officer (including the image he projected) plus you (including your recognition and assent to authority) equals the responsibility in the situation. Were he not there, you would not have moved--true enough. If you thought nothing of officers, if you neither feared nor respected the law, however, you would not have moved either."

Ceding freedom to authority does not happen without an act of concession, which leaves the conceder partially responsible. It does not follow from this that the weight or prestige of authority is completely fabricated by the person who concedes to it. More accurately, it is as though the officer says, "I m to be listened to," and the conceder responds, "I agree."

It is often held against a person who goes her own way by critical contemporaries that her actions are capricious. "She has no rule by which she acts; she only does whatever strikes her fancy at the time." - "Do you suggest that a person who on the contrary only acts on rules never does what strikes her fancy? If she acts, for instance, according to the rule, 'Always abide by the law and its officers' commands,' she does not act from her fancy (i.e., what she prefers)? I cannot agree--for a thing chosen is ultimately a thing most preferred. Since a person who submits to authority--to some extent--chooses to, that person's fancy is active. From your criticism, you imply that a person's fancy is always capricious. The person who acts on rules is also capricious."

If the criticism for a person who goes his own way also adheres to the rule-abider, how might the rule-abider more aptly criticize the independent person? Both sorts act on rules (to abide by fancy and to abide by authority) and both sorts are capricious (insofar as what they do is influenced by what they fancy). What precisely is the difference between them? The independent person gives the greatest credence to her own passions and convictions; the dependent person gives the greatest credence to an outside source. Though both invest themselves into positions they bare responsibility for, they invest in different positions.

The independent person says of himself, "I am honest. I know that what I think and do is at bottom a consequence of what I most recently have thought is true and good. I recognize that I am free to accept or reject my own predilections. I think the only consistent thing to do is to accept them, since rejecting them is still done on the grounds of a predilection--that what I most recently have thought is true and good is actually false and bad."

The dependent person says of himself, "I am correct. I know that my private predilections are given to error, so I reject them in favor of more impersonal decision-makers. I accept authority because it is greater than I am, has a larger wealth of input and understanding. I recognize that a person can never upon reflection know objectively whether they are thinking correctly and doing rightly with certainty, so I defer to an outside party for objectivity."

The independent person emphasizes subjectivity; the dependent person emphasizes objectivity. The rule-abider may aptly criticize the independent person for solipsism. The independent person may retort with a charge of bad faith (a conscious disavowal of freedom where freedom persists) against the dependent person.

The independent person faces a problem of epistemology. The dependent person faces a problem of ethics. The independent person believes as she does on circular grounds; she believes she is right because she believes she is right. The dependent person operates on a faulty notion of her beliefs, for she acts as though she is not free and thereby not responsibly when she is both (if only partially).

When one retains autonomy, one retains the risk of faulty self-determination. When one concedes to heteronomy, one retains responsibility for the concession with the risk of thinking it too was handed over. When faced with the dichotomy between autonomy and heteronomy, what will the existing individual do? Those who seek the truth will choose the former; those who avoid error will choose the latter.

Is it possible that the existing individual may choose one in one circumstance, and the other in another? Yes. How are the circumstances different if they prompt different choices from the same individual? Rules cover different areas of conduct. The passion the individual feels about the area of conduct influences the individual's choice. For some, an area of scant personal relevance and importance is an area that most warrants heteronomy. To them, the feeling of apathy makes the discharge of responsibility permissible. "I don't care. You decide." For others, an area of immense personal relevance and importance is an area that most warrants heteronomy. To them, the feeling of gravity makes the discharge of responsibility permissible. "I care too much. You decide."

Should a person be consistently one or the other or should a person be both, though in different areas? In economics, it is commonly advisable for the sake of mitigating risk to diversify one's portfolio. In politics, it is commonly advisable for the sake of reputation to toe the party line. The former has the benefit of safety for the investor; the latter has the benefit of predictability for the politician. Does a person want to benefit privately (by self-reflective standards of benefit) or publicly (by other-reflective standards of benefit)? A person esteems inconsistency because it is not constricting upon them. People esteem consistency because it is readily understandable and therefor manageable.

By marching, one accepts partial responsibility for the path taken and the destination arrived at, since one participates in both. By not marching, one accepts consequences from the authority for not recognizing him. March and you may be led off a cliff by your own feet; stay still and you may be shot for insubordination by an authority you do not recognize. Marching is a dangerous movement if the destination is still; stillness is a precarious position if the setting is in motion.